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Perspectives on Antitrust Law
A Case for Letting a Firm Take
Advantage of "Locked-In" Customers
by
DWIGHT R. LEE and RICHARD B. MCKENzIE*

Introduction
Many products are said to exhibit "network effects." This means
that the value a consumer realizes from the product increases as the
number of consumers using the product increases.' Telephones, fax
machines, computer operating systems, internet browsing software,
and word processing software are several of the more obvious and
widely cited examples of goods with network effects (two of which,
operating systems and web browsers, have become central to the
antitrust prosecution of the Microsoft Corporation). 2 However, it has
been pointed out that many other products-for example, some
books-also exhibit network effects (readers gain the added benefits

*The Authors are, respectively, professors in the Terry College of Business at the
University of Georgia, Athens, and in the Graduate School of Management at the
University of California, Irvine. This Article was prepared for presentation at a
symposium entitled Consumers in the DigitalAge: Perspectiveson the Intersection of Law,
Technological Innovation, and Consumer Protection held at the University of California,
Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco (Feb. 10, 2001).
1. W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by
Historical Events, ECON. J., Mar. 1989, at 116 [hereinafter Arthur, Competing
Technologies]; W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and the New World of Business,
HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1996, at 100, 102-03; W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbackin
the Economy, Sci. AM., Feb. 1990, at 92, 93, 98.
2. Complaint at 19-21, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C.
2000) (No. 98-1232), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1700/1763.htm.
[795]
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of being able to discuss the book when many others read the same
3
book).
According to network theorists, when incompatibilities exist
between different variations of a product, it is possible for a producer
of one of the variations to secure a competitive advantage over
producers of other variations by being the first one to achieve a
critical market share, the net result of which is that the market "tips"
toward the dominant producer, causing its market share to expand
with consumer demand that, in turn, reflects growing consumer
benefits caused by the producer's growing market dominance. 4 With
the retreat of other producers from the market, consumers may find
themselves "locked in" to the most widely used variation of the
product simply because it is widely used, with perhaps superior
variations of the product having a difficult time entering the market
and attracting consumers. The cost of actually switching to another
technology or product (which involves the costs of retraining, and
new equipment and software, as well as the establishment of new
office routines and, possibly, cultures) reinforces this lock-in. 5 This
suggests to some that a firm that is aggressively lowering price and
expanding output could be a potential monopolist and a suitable
candidate for antitrust action, if its product generates network effects.
Indeed, the Justice Department has argued that Microsoft's
monopoly stems from network effects, coupled with the protection
against market entrants afforded Microsoft by the 70,000 existing
Windows applications, the source of the so-called "applications
'6
barrier to entry."

3. ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 18-19

(1995).
4. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 105-06 [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Systems
Competition]; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of
Network Externalities, 94 J.POL. ECON. 822, 826-28 (1986) [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro,
Technology Adoption]; see also Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities,
Competition,and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424, 429-32 (1985) [hereinafter Katz
& Shapiro, Network Externalities].
5. See, e.g., Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON.
REV. 332, 334-36 (1985). In the article, David argued that the QWERTY keyboard
continues to dominate the arrangement of keys on keyboards simply because QWERTY
was adopted early on in the history of typewriters in order to minimize the extent to which
keys would become entangled as they struck the paper. Id. at 333-34. Supposedly, the
cost of retraining typists has prevented the adoption of superior keyboards. Id. at 336.
6. Complaint at 19, Microsoft Corp., (No. 98-1232); United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19-24 (D.D.C. 1999).
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While there are efficiencies realized from the widespread use of
one variation of the product from what can be called demand-side
economies of scale, the concern is that such action can lead not only
to a monopoly position, but to a monopoly position for an inferior
product.7 When there is evidence that this is happening, antitrust
action is commonly recommended with a remedy of breaking up the
monopoly (or potential monopoly), as was done by the Justice
Department and judge in the Microsoft case. 8
The case for antitrust action to counter inefficiencies arising from
network effects and lock-in has been vigorously attacked. At the
forefront of this attack are Liebowitz and Margolis, who argue on
both empirical and theoretical grounds that there is little risk of
inferior technologies and products becoming entrenched by lock-ins
caused by network effects.9 For example, Liebowitz and Margolis
dispute the inferiority of the QWERTY 10 keyboard arrangement and
of the VHS" format for videorecorders, which are commonly cited
examples of the inferior out-competing the superior because of the
lock-in effect. Of course, with constant technological improvements
there are cases of existing technologies being widely used and
benefiting from network effects and significant switching costs,
despite being inferior to new technologies. But if the gains from
switching are greater than the costs of doing so, incentives exist for
entrepreneurs-so-called "network sponsors"-to overcome the
built-in resistance to change. Each consumer may face the prisoners'
dilemma of being unwilling to switch to the new technology even
though all would be better off if all (or most) switched. The
entrepreneur-owner of the new technology, however, can internalize
this effect by sharing the gains of the efficiency improvements with
customers through subsidies in the form of low, possibly negative,
prices over some period of time. Not all network effects are
necessarily network externalities, with the latter leading to potential
market inefficiencies that might require collective correction.
Without such internalization of network effects, it is hard to
explain the large number of new products and technologies that
7. Arthur, Competing Technologies,supra note 1, at 116-17.
8. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59,63-65 (D.D.C. 2000).
9. S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence,Lock-In, and History, 11
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 223-24 (1995)

[hereinafter Liebowitz & Margolis, Path

Dependence]; SJ. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 4 (1990) [hereinafter Liebowitz & Margolis, The Fable].
10. Liebowitz & Margolis, The Fable,supra note 9, at 7-8.
11. Liebowitz & Margolis, Path Dependence,supra note 9, at 219-22.
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overcame the network/switching cost advantage of previously
dominant products and technologies. Examples of how firms
overcome lock-in have become common, including cellular phone
companies (Pacific Bell) that have offered free or reduced-price
phones for new customers, software companies (Microsoft) that have
lowered the prices for users of competing applications, banks
(Citibank) that have offered credits for customers' initial Internet
transactions, and Internet retail sites (MotherNature.com) that have
provided advertised discounts on customers' initial purchases.
In 1998, the Justice Department accused Microsoft of engaging in
"predatory pricing" tactics with the intent of crushing Netscape, a
potential rival for the computer platform market, by giving away
Internet Explorer, and by integrating Internet Explorer into Windows
at no additional cost.12 In addition, Microsoft was accused of, at
times, charging below-zero prices by offering Internet service
providers an upfront fee (what the Justice Department called
"bribes") for making Internet Explorer their recommended
3
browser.1
Of course, a consumer subsidy to overcome the lock-in effect of
an existing product is an investment that sellers expect to generate
positive returns through higher prices for their products once
consumers get "locked in" again.' 4 Obviously such investments are
risky, as the new products may not be sufficiently superior to replace
existing products, or may have a short reign in the marketplace even
if they do. We can think of the high prices temporarily realized from
establishing a large and "locked-in" market share as an incentive for
technological improvements and as a means by which consumers
reimburse suppliers for helping them overcome the prisoners'
dilemma. Put another way, without the potential for some degree of
"lock-in," network firms might not have sufficient incentive to lower
their initial prices for the purpose of creating the network and
providing users with the attendant network benefits as the network
expands. This suggests caution in attempts to use antitrust remedies
12. Complaint at 6-7, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C.
2000) (No. 98-1232), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1700/1763.htm.
13. Franklin Fisher, one of the Justice Department's economic experts made this
argument. Transcript of Proceedings before the Hon. Thomas P. Jackson, June 1, 1999
(A.M. Session) at 39, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000)
(No. 98-1232); see also Complaint at 9-10, Microsoft Corp. (No. 98-1232).
14. Paul Klemperer has argued that with switching costs, price wars are likely. Paul
Klemperer, Price Wars Caused by Switching Costs, 56 REv. ECON. STUD. 405, 415 (1989)
[hereinafter Klemperer, Price Wars]. Indeed, the intensity of the price wars can be a
function of the switching costs.
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to prevent firms from exploiting "locked-in" consumers. Even if a
firm is able to exploit network effects and switching costs by locking
in consumers indefinitely, breaking up the firm under the banner of
increased competition will actually do less to protect consumers than
standard models would indicate, and may even harm consumers.
In the next section we develop a model of a firm selling a product
that generates network effects, but not network externalities. That is
to say, the demand for its product in each period increases as the
number of units currently in use increases. Under the assumption
that the firm is able to expand until it dominates the market and is
able to fully exploit all network effects, we extend the analyses of
others 15 and examine the effect of threatening to break up the firm
into separate competing units (or in other ways that impair the ability
of the firm to exploit locked-in consumers). If credible, we find that
the breakup threat is certain to produce a price reduction that is less
than the standard monopoly model would predict, and may even
result in a current price increase. Any resulting increase in efficiency
is less than the standard model would predict, even when ignoring the
very real possibility that the antitrust action reduces network benefits
to consumers and retards the introduction of new technologies.
H. The Model
Consider a firm that is producing a product that generates a
network effect. To capture this effect, we represent the price, P, in
each time period as a negative function of the quantity sold currently
and a nonnegative function of the cumulative quantity of all past
sales, adjusted for decreases due to deterioration and discard. In
period t, for example, the price, or inverse demand function, is given
by
(1) pt (Qt,

t-1

Xt- iQ )

i=l

with Pit < 0 and Pt 0, where the subscripts represent partial
derivatives with respect to the indicated variable, Qi is the quantity
sold in period i, and X e (0, 1) is the deterioration and discard rate
15. See, e.g., Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities, supra note 4; Katz & Shapiro,
Systems Competition, supra note 4; Paul Klemperer, Entry Deterrence in Markets with
Consumer Switching Costs, ECON. J., 1987 Conference, at 99; Klemperer, Price Wars,
supranote 14.
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each period. We assume that the marginal cost of production is zero
in each period.
The firm's objective is to maximize the discounted present value
of profits over some time horizon T, given by
t

(2)

c = P1(Q1,0)Q, + ZP

t-1

t

(Q t, Z

i=2

k-' Qi)QtDt-1

i=1

where D = 1/(1+r), with r being the discount rate. We assume that
the time horizon T is such that at time T the accumulated sales (net of
deterioration and discard) are sufficiently large that the network
effect is complete, orP2 =0.
The Qis that maximize (2) necessarily satisfy
T

(3.1)

L9Q
1

[
[p

+

Z Q P 2 t X' D

,+pl]+
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t= 2

T
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(3.T)

tr

a,

OQT
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i= t+1

[P T +

QTpl T ]D

=

0

These necessary conditions yield to a straightforward
interpretation. The first term in each equation in (3) is the current
period marginal revenue. The second term in the first T-1 equation in
(3) is the present value of future marginal revenue from current sales
and is positive. Therefore, the current period marginal revenues are
negative in the first T-1 periods, and the quantities sold in periods 1
through T-1 are increased until the marginal losses from current
period sales are equal to the marginal gain from enhanced future
demand through the network effect. In period T the marginal
network effect is zero and therefore the current period marginal
revenue is also zero. There is no further advantage in expanding sales
beyond the amount that maximizes current revenue. The negative
marginal revenues in the earlier periods represent the investment
mentioned in the introduction that begins yielding a return to the firm
in period T when it begins behaving like a conventional monopolist-

April 2001]

"LOCKED IN" CUSTOMERS

equating current period marginal revenue to marginal cost (zero in

our model).
What do conditions in (3) tell us about the effect of government
action designed to prevent the firm from exploiting the monopoly
position, beginning in period T, assuming that it achieves that
position? Consider first the effect of a credible threat to prevent the
future price from increasing to the monopoly level. Such a threat
clearly reduces the return the firm can expect to realize by investing

in the network effect. By reducing the positive value of the second
terms in the first T-1 equations in (3), a cap on future prices calls for a
less negative current marginal value in the early periods. So the
attempt to protect consumers against high future prices results in

higher current prices as the firm reduces output.16 Not only are
current prices increased, but also the value of the product is
decreased as the reduction in output reduces the network advantage

realized by consumers. 17
Attempts to protect consumers against exploitation by a
potentially successful network monopolist by breaking it up (or in any
other way holding future prices and profits down) can also generate
counterproductive results. If the breakup is anticipated the result will
be qualitatively the same as imposing a price cap on the future price.

Not being able to capture the future monopoly benefits from
subsidizing sales currently, the firm will respond by reducing sales
(and network benefits) and charging higher prices in early periods.
But what if the firm is broken up at some point before the
network monopoly is complete, say in period j < T? Such a breakup
16. The analysis here, which suggests that network effects lead to suppressed initial
prices, is similar to the work of Lee and Kruetzer, who developed the theory of "lagged
demand." See generally David Kreutzer, Lagged Demands and a "Perverse" Response to
Threatened Property Rights, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 579 (1982). It is likewise similar to the
analysis of Becker and Murphy, who were concerned with the development of a theory of
"rational addiction." See generally Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of
RationalAddiction, 96 J. POL. ECON. 675 (1988).
17. The effect of the threat is particularly detrimental to consumer welfare where all
or most costs of production are upfront costs, that is, the marginal cost of production is
zero, or close to zero (which is presumed to be the case in many lines of software,
especially operating systems, given that copies of an operating system can be loaded on
new computers by original equipment manufacturers by simply copying files from one
computer to the next with few material resources and little time involved). In the absence
of lock-ins or switching costs, potential network sponsors would be reluctant to make the
upfront investment in the development of their products for fear that their investments
would rightfully be treated as sunk costs in ongoing competitive struggles with other firms
in which the price would be pushed toward marginal cost, which is close or equal to zero.
Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities,supra note 4, at 424; Klemperer, Price Wars, supra
note 14, at 405.
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might cause a current increase in output and a lower price as several
firms are now competing for market share, but it might not. And
even if it does motivate more output and a lower price, the effect will
be smaller than the standard monopoly model predicts. Being more
precise, we rewrite the j' equation from the necessary conditions (3)
as
T

(4)

[ pi +(1-

5)Q jPi] +(1-

3)

YQtP 2tkt-lDt

=0

t=j+l

with 8 = 0.
If the firm is broken up in period j, the parameter 8 increases
from zero, indicating that it no longer accounts for the entire market
for the product. The question is: What is the effect of an increase in
5 on the left-hand side of (4), the current and future marginal revenue
in period j? Differentiating (4) with respect to 3, evaluated at 5 = 0,
yields
T

(5)

QtP t X t

-(Q Pij +

Dt- )

t= j+1

From (4) it follows that (5) = 0 when 1 =0, (5) > 0 when V > 0,
and (5) < 0 when V < 0. In the case where t > 0, then breaking up
the firm (assuming production costs remain unaffected) results in an
expansion of output to maintain a marginal revenue of zero. This is
the standard result and is what one would hope for when combating
monopoly influence. But, as we shall see, even in this case the effect
is not as strong as the standard monopoly model leads us to expect. If
V = 0, then breaking up the firm would have no effect on current
output. And if V < 0, then breaking up the firm would have the effect
of actually reducing current output and increasing price.
Considering the effect of a zero, or even a negative (or less than
marginal) production costs, price is not as far fetched as it may seem.
With network effects, giving away a product, or even paying people to
use it, can increase the present value of the product, and the present
value of future revenues, sufficiently to make up for non-positive
prices in early periods. Indeed, the possibility of non-positive prices
is more likely than the present model indicates. In our model, the
only positive spillover from current sales of the product is enhanced
future demand. But commonly, the firm has several complementary
products and there are intratemporal, as well as intertemporal,
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positive spillovers from expanding the use of one of the products.
Breaking up such a firm would not only reduce the intertemporal
advantage in keeping the price of a product low, it could eliminate
entirely the intratemporal motivations to do so, which increases the
likelihood that breaking up the firm will cause a price increase.
For example, Microsoft has an array of products that run from
the operating system (Windows) to applications (Word and Excel) to
content sources (Encarta) to advertising on its Internet service site
(MSN). When Microsoft holds down the price of Windows, it
encourages the development of the Windows network as more
computer users buy Windows, more programmers develop
applications, and even more computer users buy Windows because
there are more applications available and more users with whom their
work is compatible. Microsoft also encourages the sale of personal
computers and more software packages, more Internet use, aid more
advertising on the web, much of the benefit of which will be garnered
by Microsoft. By having the array of products, Microsoft has
managed to internalize the benefits of holding the price of Windows
in check, which adds to its incentives to do just that.
Breaking up a single firm into several competing firms has the
well-known effect of increasing the marginal revenue of each firm
over that of a single firm in the industry. By itself, the increase in
marginal revenue provides a strong motivation for the firms to
increase output and lower price. Since this motivation is unopposed
in the standard model, the effect of breaking up a single firm is an
unequivocal increase in output and reduction in price. With network
effects, the situation is complicated by the fact that breaking up a
single firm reduces the internalization of the network effects. The
ability a single firm has to capture the additional future revenue from
increasing its current output is reduced as more firms are created.
With several firms, the additional future demand that each firm's
current sales creates is captured in large measure by other firms.
Therefore, breaking up a single firm reduces the future marginal
revenue from current sales, which at least partially (and possibly
more than) offsets the increase in the current marginal revenue from
current sales.'8
18. Benjamin Klein has developed a similar line of argument, but using graphical
techniques, to explain why a firm with complementary products might charge sub-zero
prices, which leads to the conclusion that a breakup of the firm can lead to positive prices.
See Benjamin Klein, Microsoft's Use of Zero Bundling to Fight the 'Browser Wars,' in
COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE
DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 217-254 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach &Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999).
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The analysis suggests an interesting possibility in the case of a
cartel of firms producing a product generating a network effect. As
opposed to the standard cartel model, it could be that each firm's
marginal revenue (current and future combined) is less than its
marginal cost (zero in our model). Collectively the firms are better
off if each takes into consideration the future benefits its sales are
generating for the other firms and resists the temptation to adjust
sales to bring its marginal revenue in line with its marginal cost. But
if this temptation is not resisted, the cartel will, like most cartels,
begin to break up. The striking difference in this case is that, as
opposed to the standard cartel, this cartel will break up as a result of
each firm reducing output and increasing price.

I. Some Efficiency Considerations
Of primary interest when discussing the effect of actions to
prevent a firm from exploiting a network effect to secure a monopoly
position is how much, if any, efficiency is increased by the action. The
standard of comparison is determined by maximizing the surplus from
the product,
T

Ql

(6) S :

J

(, 0)d'c +Z

0

t=2

Qt

fP2(T,-"XT-iQi)dtDt0

with respect to each period's output.
necessarily satisfy the conditions
(7) P + MFSi = 0

t-1

i=1

The Qis that maximize S

i = 1, 2,...,T

where MFSi is the present value of the marginal future surplus from
expanding output in period i. Since MFS, > 0 for all i < T (we
continue to let T represent the period in which the marginal netwotrk
effect is zero even though the time this occurs varies with the Qis),
condition (7) requires that P1< 0, i = 1,2,..., T-1.
The first thing to recognize is that it is not necessarily the case
that, at least during the early periods, the firm, if left free to maximize
profits through the creation of a network monopoly (the conditions in
(3)), will underproduce and overcharge compared to the surplus
maximizing conditions given in (7). For any given Qi and
accumulated stock of the good in period i,Pi isgreater than the single
firm's current marginal revenue in period i,or pi +QiP . But for any
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given sequence of Qs from period i to period T and any given
accumulated stock in period i, the second term in (7), MFS,, is also
T

greater than the second term in the ihequation in (3),

QP
j=i+l

This follows from the fact that the second term in (7) captures all the
future surplus from selling an additional unit in period i, while the
second term in (3) captures only the additional revenue the firm
receives from selling the additional unit in period i. So, the socially
efficient output in period i may also be the one that satisfies the single
firm profit maximizing condition in the same period. We are not
suggesting that this is likely, just that it is possible. We also
acknowledge that as time T is approached it becomes increasingly
certain that the single-firm output will become smaller than the
socially efficient output. The difference between P and current
period marginal revenue in period i does not diminish in any
way as T is approached, but the difference between MFS i
systematic
T
and YQP2j0-D- goes to zero as both vanish in period T. So even
j=i+l

though the single firm may produce close to, or even more than, the
socially efficient quantity early on as it is attempting to establish a
network monopoly, it will begin behaving more like a traditional
monopolist as its monopoly position becomes established.
Given the eventual inefficiency of a potentially successful
network monopolist, is it likely that public policy aimed at reducing
the firm's exercise of monopoly power will improve efficiency? As
discussed in the previous section, a credible commitment to prevent
the firm from benefiting from a future network monopoly with a price
ceiling or a future breakup has the effect of reducing the incentive to
expand current output by reducing future marginal revenue with
respect to that output. There is the interesting possibility that such a
reduction in output can increase in-period efficiency because the firm
may be selling less than the socially efficient amount in an early
period. But the reason for the commitment to regulate is that the
firm will eventually be producing too little, and so a policy that
reduces output will soon be reducing rather than increasing efficiency.
A policy of breaking up a firm into several competing firms
before it has established a full network monopoly (or, again, by other
means of holding down its future prices and profits) can also be
counterproductive. If the breakup occurs when the firm's price is
negative, we have seen that it will cause a decrease in current output
by reducing the incentive effect of that output on future demand.
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Unless this occurs when the firm is producing more than called for by
the conditions in (6), the effect will be the opposite of what efficiency
requires, at least initially. Of course, later in time when the single
firm would have been charging a positive price, the effect of having
broken it up will be to increase output and improve efficiency. So it is
possible that breaking up a potential network monopolist will
improve overall efficiency. But, the presence of network effects will
severely limit the efficiency gains that can be generated by competing
firms. Replacing a single firm with several competing firms will bring
each firm's current marginal revenue more in line with the marginal
social value of the product. But, the more firms there are the greater
the discrepancy between each firm's future marginal revenue from
current sales and the future marginal value of the social surplus
generated by current sales. So while increasing the number of firms is
promoting efficiency on one margin, it is undermining efficiency on
The standard argument favoring numerous
another margin.
competing firms over one firm loses much of its force when network
effects are present.
Of course, the efficiency gains from breaking up a firm creating a
network monopoly are sure to turn positive and rise as the network
becomes increasingly established, at least as indicated by a
comparison of necessary conditions (3) and (7). The smaller the
marginal network effect from current sales, the more our analysis
becomes a standard monopoly versus competition comparison and
the greater the advantage of several competing firms over a
monopoly supplier. Efficiency could, no doubt, be improved if a firm
could be kept unaware of any antitrust threat until it had established
a network monopoly and then was broken up. At least, it could be
improved in this one case. The problem is that any efficiency
achieved in this one case will lead to expectations on the part of other
firms whose products create network effects that will motivate
inefficient responses. Once the possibility that successful network
monopolists will be broken up becomes recognized, new firms with
new technologies will be less aggressive at cutting prices and
expanding output to establish new, or replace existing, networks.
This can reduce not only the social value these firms create directly,
but it can also reduce the indirect value they create through the
discipline their existence exerts over existing market power by
established network monopolists-a control more responsive to
consumer preferences and consistent with dynamic efficiency than is
realistically possible from antitrust action.
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IV. Creating Networks
Many discussions of networks presume that "network effects"
are a part of nature, much as gravity or chemical reactions are. When
an operating system firm-the "network sponsor"-sells more copies
of its operating system, then applications firms will write more
applications, more or less naturally, without any encouragement from
the operating system firm. That may sometimes be the case, but
certainly not always. Developers may be reluctant to join the
network for any number of reasons, not the least of which is that the
network in question might not be the successful network. That is, as
developers prepare to write applications for one network (Apple), the
market could "tip" toward some other network (Windows). The
developers' investments could then be worthless. The developers'
investment risk costs are heightened by the fact that the size and
durability of the network is outside of their direct control, and is
controlled by the network sponsor, which is a problem in risk
allocation that can be remedied with appropriate side payments.
As Katz and Shapiro have argued, given that much of the
investment in networks can be upfront, the actual investment made
by applications developers (and the network sponsor) will depend
upon their expectations about how the market will evolve over time,
which can be influenced by how much the network sponsor is willing
to spend up front to ensure that the market tips toward its network
product and not toward some other firm's product.' 9 The network
sponsor, in other words, may want to shoulder some of the
applications developers' risk costs just to manage expectations, that
is, encourage the expectation among applications developers that the
network sponsor's product will be the product toward which the
market will tip. The greater the potential profits from the market
tipping and lock-in, the greater amount the network sponsor would
be willing to spend up front to encourage the development of the
network, and the development of locked-in customers. This is a
slightly different way of restating a central point of our argument,
which is that even the customers need not mind being locked in
securely, given that the network could develop more rapidly, and with
greater consumer benefits, than if the network sponsor does not
encourage the development of applications and lock-ins.
Understandably, if the market is prone to tip and to leave
consumers and applications developers locked in, the applications
19. Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities,supra note 4, at 424-29.
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developers also have to fear that the operating system firm/network
sponsor will, once it has achieved its monopoly position, begin to
extract monopoly rents, curbing its sales in the process, but also the
sales of the developers' applications. The more they have to fear the
monopoly practices of the network sponsor, the more reluctant they
can be to write applications for the network. To overcome their
reluctance, the firm sponsoring the network may either have to lower
its upfront price or aid the developers by covering their development
costs or providing outright payment to developers for writing to the
network. Such payments can be viewed as pre-payment of monopoly
rents that the developers expect will be extracted later when the
network sponsor achieves its monopoly position. This leads to the
interesting conclusion that the so-called monopoly, the dominant
network sponsor, may have largely dissipated the expected monopoly
rents among the developers and consumers, prior to when the
monopoly rents are extracted.
The upfront payment problems of the network sponsor can be, as
mentioned earlier, a consequence of the fact that the network sponsor
may not be able to make a credible commitment to not take
advantage of any monopoly position that is achieved in the future.
The developers have to fear that the network sponsor will renege on
its commitment, say, to hold its future prices to competitive levels. If
it does achieve monopoly status, but does not renege, then its stock
price can be suppressed because of the absence of the potential
monopoly profits that could be extracted. This means that savvy
investors can take over the network firm and hike prices and profits.
Seen from this perspective, the network sponsor/potential monopolist
can favor antitrust enforcement. Antitrust enforcement can make the
network sponsor's commitment not to charge monopoly prices in the
future credible (or more credible than otherwise), which means that
the network sponsor would not have to lower its price or increase its
side payments to applications developers (by as much as otherwise).
Barring antitrust enforcement, the network sponsor can ease the
fears of outside developers by licensing its network product to several
producers. It can also develop complementary products, which, for
an operating system firm, would mean applications of its own (as
Microsoft has done). The network sponsor would then have an
incentive to hold down the price of its product, thereby easing the
need to make side payments to outside developers. The greater the
array of complements the network sponsor has, the greater the
assurance that outside developers will have that the network sponsor
will not in the future hike the price and curb the sales of the network
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good. Hence, a breakup of a horizontally integrated operating
system/applications firm can, once again, reduce the incentive of the
network firm to hold its prices down. It can thus reduce the incentive
the applications developers have to stay with the network, the net
result of which can be a contraction of the network and lost consumer
benefits.
Applications developers can also be concerned that the network
sponsor will be timid about defending the network against takeover
by some other network standard. The more durable the network is
perceived to be, the more applications developers are willing to invest
upfront. Hence, it follows that the network sponsor can reduce its
upfront payments to developers by showing them that it stands ready
to compete ferociously to suppress any new competitive threat to its
network standard, which, coincidentally is precisely what Microsoft
did when it was confronted with the prospects of its Windows
standard being overrun by a new computing platform based on
Netscape's Navigator. The judge in the Microsoft case interpreted
Microsoft's zero and negative prices for Internet Explorer as
"predation" with the obvious consequence of raising the "dangerous
probability" that Microsoft would be able to act like a monopoly in
the future. 20
V. Concluding Comments
Lock-in is not all bad. Nor are switching costs all bad. They
might reduce the ease with which new firms can attract customers
from established producers. However, switching costs can also be a
reason that new firms with potentially superior products will incur
what are often substantial upfront development costs associated with
many network goods (software, for example). They also provide a
grounds for why firms interested in developing a network would be
willing to "underprice" their product initially, which can have the
benefit of helping to build the network more quickly. In such
network environments, threats to break up firms (because they are
perceived to be the dominant producer and, hence, monopolies or
because their pricing may appear "predatory") and deny the firms the
benefits of networks through lower prices (and other means of
encouraging customers to switch from established firms) and through
the internalization of network externalities, can have the effect of

20. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30,45-46 (D.D.C. 2000).
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raising prices. Such an outcome must be construed as perverse, given
conventionally professed goals of antitrust enforcement.
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